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Air Crash Investigation:Spanair 5022

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Добавлено by Admin В Расследование авиакатастроф
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Описание

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An aircraft operated by Spanair was scheduled for its domestic passenger flight to Gran Canaria with the stopover at Madrid Barajas Airport.

The flight took off from Barcelona at 08:55 and landed in Madrid at 10:13. The flight was uneventful.

From here the flight was then scheduled for departure at 1:00 pm with the same crew.

13:10:18

Onboard the aircraft were 166 passengers and 6 crew members.

13:24
ATC
SPANAIR 5022, WIND 150 06, CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF RUNWAY 36 LEFT.

The crew found some abnormality in the aircraft and requested permission from ATC to exit the runway.

Captain
LOOK, WE HAVE A SLIGHT PROBLEM, WE HAVE TO EXIT THE RUNWAY AGAIN

The crew had detected an abnormally high Ram Air Temperature probe reading. When the aircraft started to taxi, the probe temperature was 56 °C, and it kept rising until it reached 104°C.

The captain contacted MCC to request guidance and information regarding the problem. The MCC instructed the captain to reset breaker Z -29, which the captain replied he had already done.

MCC then suggested the crew get assistance from maintenance in Barajas. Then MCC contacted their shift manager at Barajas and informed him about the problem and that the airplane was returning to the stand.

At the same time, the crew contacted Spanair’s ground assistance agent and requested to fix the problem. The agent contacted the operations department at the company’s headquarters. The headquarters authorized replacing the aircraft since another was available. Then the agent informed the crew that the replacement of the aircraft had been authorized, but the crew decided to wait until maintenance reported on the scope of the malfunction.

Two maintenance technicians reported to the airplane. A visual check did not reveal any abnormalities. Then the technicians used the ice protection meter selector and heat switch to ensure that the RAT probe heating circuit was energized, which confirmed the malfunction.

The technician checked the Minimum Equipment List and saw that the airplane could be dispatched with the probe heating inoperative if the icing conditions were not forecast for the flight.

With the permission of the supervisor, the technician allowed the flight to be dispatched with breaker Z-29 pulled to disconnect the electrical supply to the RAT probe heater. The captain agreed.

ATC
SPANAIR 5022 NEXT IN LINE BEHIND AIRLINE MD80, TAXI INTO POSITION AND HOLD RUNWAY 36L”.

ATC cleared the aircraft for takeoff immediately afterward.

14:23
The engine throttles advanced followed by the release of the brakes

The stall warning and stick shaker activated, as well as the horn and a synthetic voice warning of an aerodynamic stall.

The calibrated airspeed was 168 knots and they were at a radio altitude of 25 ft, a pitch angle of 15.5°, and a right bank angle of 4.4°.

The right bank increased to 20°, the crew changed the position of the throttle levers of about 4° in the left and 32° in the right in the direction of reduced thrust. Then the throttles were immediately moved to their maximum thrust positions.

The aircraft reached 40ft in the radio altitude with its pitch angle of 18.3° and started to fall.

The plane slammed into the river bank. The aircraft was destroyed, which killed 154 of 166 people on board.

Investigation

The investigation was done by Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission Spain.

According to the investigators
The crew did not properly use the checklists, which contain items to select and verify the position of the flaps when preparing the flight.

They did not act to select the flaps/slats with the associated control lever in the "After Start" checklist.

As well as crew omitted the check of the flaps and slats during the "Takeoff briefing".

They added that the absence of a takeoff configuration warning resulting from the failure of the TOWS also contributed to the accident. The TOWS did not warn the crew that the airplane’s takeoff configuration was not appropriate. 

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Simulator used RFS:https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=it.rortos.realflightsimulator

Final Report:https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2008/20080820-0_MD82_EC-HFP.pdf

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#spanair #spanair5022 #spain #avgeek #aircrash #planecrash #aviation #airplane #RFS

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